Warrant, Proper Function, and the Great
Pumpkin Objection
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lvin Plantinga claims that belief in God can be taken
as properly basic, without appealing to arguments or
relying on faith. Traditionally, any account of the
knowledge for the existence of God has gone
something like this:
(1) Person P believes the statement S “God exists” is true.
(2) The statement S “God exists” is true.
(3) P has sufficient evidence for the truth of the statement
S “God exists”.
_______________________________
Thus, (4) Person P knows that God exists.
Plantinga maintains that any formal process of justification,
supplied by premise (3), is unnecessary in giving one knowledge
to the existence of God. He claims one can bypass premise (2)
and (3) and go directly from premise (1) to the conclusion.
Plantinga maintains that “belief in God is properly basic - that is,
such that it is rational to accept it without accepting it on the
basis of any other propositions or beliefs at all.”1 Thus, it is
rational to believe in the existence of God without appeal to
arguments or appeal to faith. In other words, we can just „know‟
God exists. Plantinga claims “a believer is entirely rational,
entirely within his epistemic rights in starting with belief in God,
in accepting it as basic, and in taking it as premise for argument
to other conclusions.”2
But, as Plantinga asks, “what is the status of criteria for
knowledge, or proper basicality, or justified belief?”3 To answer
this, Plantinga rejects the epistemology of both foundationalism
and coherence theories. That is, he claims (1) “being self-evident,
or incorrigible, or evident to the senses is not a necessary
condition of proper basicality”4 and (2) “belief in God is...
rational to accept it without accepting it on the basis of any other
propositions or beliefs at all.”5 Instead, Plantinga accepts a
version of weak foundationalism that relies on a notion of proper
basicality, and claims, “A weak foundationalist is likely to hold
that some properly basic beliefs are such that anyone who
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accepts them, knows them.” 6
But how reliable is this account to give us knowledge,
especially of the existence of God? While responding to an
objection against his own theory of proper basicality (The Great
Pumpkin Objection), Plantinga develops an account of epistemic
warrant upon the notion of having proper functioning cognitive
equipment. In light of this theory, Keith Lehrer has raised
several objections against Plantinga‟s account of epistemic
warrant. In this paper, I will look at Plantinga‟s account of
epistemic warrant and Lehrer‟s objections to Plantinga‟s theory.
Finally, after having evaluated Lehrer‟s objections and
Plantinga‟s responses, I will maintain that Plantinga still has not
satisfactorily established a viable epistemology that accounts for
the existence of God.
(I) The Great Pumpkin Objection
This objection asks, “If we say that belief in God is
properly basic, will we not be committed to holding that just
anything, or nearly anything can properly be taken as basic?”7 In
other words, since Plantinga makes the claim that the knowledge
of God‟s existence can be taken as properly basic without any
reference to other beliefs that we have, then does that mean that
someone can hold, as properly basic, beliefs that other “bizarre
aberration(s)” also exist? As Plantinga asks, “What about the
belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I
take that as basic? And if I can‟t, why can I properly take belief in
God as basic?”8
This objection recognizes the difficulty in maintaining
knowledge of God‟s existence while appealing to a system that
lacks either internal and external justification or coherence. If
knowledge is simply a matter of holding a true belief about
something, then why is it not possible to claim beliefs about
things like „the Great Pumpkin exists‟ as knowledge? Plantinga
maintains that holding such a claim is mistaken. But why? At
first Plantinga responds, by claiming that according to reformed
epistemologists, “certain beliefs are properly basic in certain
circumstances; [while] those same beliefs may not be properly
basic in other circumstances.”9 Thus Plantinga is making some
sort of distinction between which beliefs count as being properly
basic from those that do not. Here, Plantinga relies on the use of
the phrase “in certain circumstances”. In certain circumstances,
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it is rational for a belief to be taken as properly basic; but what
are those „certain circumstances‟? Plantinga seems to know what
these certain circumstances are, but he is not effective at
elucidating what they are. By what theory does Plantinga
propose to outline those circumstances?
Plantinga contends that “What the Reformed
epistemologist holds is that there are widely realized
circumstances in which belief in God is properly basic.”10
However, this response does not answer the question about a
criterion of „circumstances‟. While maintaining a weak
foundationalist account of proper basicality, Plantinga must still
accept the burden of being accountable for some explanation of
his theory. That is, he must be able to demonstrate how, under
these „certain circumstances‟ it is possible to take the existence of
God as properly basic. To this objection, Plantinga claims,
Must one have such a criterion before one can
sensibly make any judgements - positive or
negative - about proper basicality? Surely not.
Suppose I do not know of a satisfactory substitute
for the criteria proposed by classical
foundationalism; I am nevertheless entirely within
my epistemic rights in holding that certain
propositions in certain conditions are not properly
basic.11
But as Lehrer claims, “To raise objections against a theory is,
however, not sufficient in philosophy. One must show that one
can construct a theory that avoids the objections and, moreover,
that clarifies the underlying problem.”12 That is, while
Plantinga‟s account of proper basicality is a response to classical
foundationalism, it still has not given a convincing answer to the
question, “How do we know that God exists?” Plantinga‟s
account of proper basicality maintains,
the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is,
broadly speaking, inductive. We must assemble
examples of beliefs and conditions such that the
former are obviously properly basic in the latter,
and examples of beliefs and conditions such that
the former are obviously not properly basic in the
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latter. We must then frame hypotheses as to the
necessary and sufficient conditions of proper
basicality and test these hypotheses by reference to
those examples.13
The way that Plantinga proposes this criterion is by (1) framing a
picture of knowledge and (2) using this to account for how we
can have knowledge in the existence of God.
The first of these two claims is very ambitious, for
Plantinga attempts to describe a picture for a theory of
knowledge. Plantinga‟s theory is: “The correct picture of
knowledge, then, goes as follows: a belief constitutes knowledge,
if it is true, and if it arises as a result of the right use and proper
functioning of our epistemic capacities.”14 Here, Plantinga has
developed three conditions for a belief to be considered as
knowledge: (1) the belief must be true, (2) the belief must arise
from our epistemic capacities functioning properly, and (3) the
true belief, derived from our epistemic capacities functioning
properly, must result from our capacities under the right use.
This definition will later be developed into an epistemic system
of warrant, and what these three conditions mean exactly will be
discussed in that account of warrant.
(II) Warrant and Proper Functionality
In his book Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga
develops his „picture of a theory of knowledge‟ that was
presented in his paper On Reformed Epistemology, into a
modified account of epistemic warrant. But what exactly does
warrant do? As Jonathan Kvanvig claims, “Warrant is thus that
elusive property sought by epistemologists for centuries that
distinguishes true belief from knowledge.”15 Further he claims
that “warrant is that property, enough of which, that is sufficient
for knowledge.”16 So, certainly we would hope that an account
that attempts to define knowledge, will be able to distinguish
mere belief in God from knowledge of God. Plantinga‟s account
of warrant is as follows:
“A belief has warrant for you if and only if (1) the
cognitive faculties involved in the production of B
are functioning properly...(2) your cognitive
environment is sufficiently similar to the one for
which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) the

49

50

JOSEPH CURTIS MILLER
triple of design plan governing the production of
the belief in question involves, as purpose or
function, the production of true beliefs; and (4) the
design plan is a good one: that is, there is a high
statistical or objective probability that a belief
produced in accordance with the relevant segment
of the design plan in that sort of environment is
true.”17
As was demonstrated earlier, this notion of „proper
functionality‟ plays a very important role in Plantinga‟s
epistemology. It is with the concept of proper functionality that
Plantinga introduces a condition of design into the properly basic
system of belief. Considering the four conditions that Plantinga
has outlined, all of them rely on properly functioning cognitive
faculties. For one‟s cognitive faculties to be functioning properly,
they must operate as they are designed to operate. That is, for
example, if you question whether your sense of vision is
functioning properly, then you may rely on past experiences
when you have known your vision to work properly and then
adjust your present vision experiences according to those past
vision experiences. For example, if I am myopic and my eyesight
is getting progressively worse, one day I might say to myself, “I
think my eyesight is getting worse, perhaps I should get a
stronger prescription to my glasses.” I would be advised to
focus my vision on objects that normally in the past have been
relatively easy for me to focus on. I would continue trying to
focus my vision upon objects at different distances, different
sizes, and different sources of light until I make note of all the
variations between my past (better) vision and my new
(degenerated) vision. Thus, if I am able to tell that my sense of
vision is not functioning properly, then I am perhaps not best
equipped for making claims to knowledge of events that I cannot
decipher visually. For example, if my vision is bad, and I am the
only witness to a murder, but did not get a good look at the
murderer, then when a row of suspects are presented to me, I
ought not to rely on just my visual accounts in deciding the guilt
of a suspect. Thus, under Plantinga‟s account, I could not take as
properly basic the knowledge that any one person committed the
murder, solely based on my visual experience.
Not only do we have to possess properly functioning
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cognitive equipment, but our equipment must be functioning in
an environment for which our faculties were designed. That is,
all of us with a good sense of hearing would find it most difficult
to listen to our favorite music 60 feet under water and really
make any sense out of it. Likewise, our normal properly
functioning environment for thinking is not a drug-induced
state. However, if we were to take an hallucinogenic or narcotic
drug, then we would find it difficult to carry on the normal
thoughts that we typically do when we are not under the
influence of these drugs. Thus, for beliefs to count as knowledge,
not only must the right conditions of cognitive equipment
(properly functioning as it is designed to operate) be met, but
also that our equipment is in an environment that cooperates
with our equipment functioning in the reliable and predictable
way that it is supposed to.
The third and fourth conditions concern the production
of true beliefs. What is required in condition (3) is that the beliefs
produced by the first two conditions, being met, are typically
true beliefs. This condition makes it so that our claims to true
beliefs are reliable, predictable, and accurate. That is, that we are
used to having true beliefs as a result of our properly functioning
equipment. Condition (4) goes beyond the claim of individual
true beliefs to see how well our beliefs correspond with reality.
Again, the concern is over how reliably, and accurately we can
predict our beliefs being with reality. If the beliefs that we
typically have in a certain environment are true, then we would
be able to take those beliefs as properly basic.
(III) Lehrer’s Critique
Keith Lehrer presents a critique against Plantinga‟s
epistemology and his notion of proper functionality and
warranted belief. The critique asks whether proper functioning
is enough to yield warrant, and, combined with true belief,
knowledge. In his objection, Lehrer tries to prove that proper
functioning is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge.
Lehrer gives two examples to illustrate this point. The first of the
two considers a man by the name of Mr. Truetemp. Mr.
Truetemp is the sufferer of an odd brain malady that requires the
usage of medication to treat it. Mr. Truetemp is only supposed
to take this medication when his temperature exceeds 98 degrees.
But of course, it is very difficult for him to monitor his
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temperature all the time. The risk of him not taking his
temperature at appropriate moments, and thus failing to take his
medication, could be fatal. Thus, Mr. Truetemp‟s concerned
doctor, along with several neural surgeons, discovered a way
that Mr. Truetemp could regulate his body temperature without
having to constantly take his temperature. The doctors have
made it possible to install a small device in the brain of people
that is able to take the patient‟s body temperature and produce
true beliefs about one‟s body temperature. Thus, if the doctors
could implant the device into Mr. Truetemp‟s brain and program
the device to produce true beliefs once an hour, then Mr.
Truetemp‟s life would become much more efficient by not
having to worry about a fatal dysfunction caused by an
excellerated body temperature.
Suppose they go through with the procedure and the
operation is a success. When Mr. Truetemp wakes up, and after
being awake for a while, Mr. Truetemp claims, “You know, I am
suddenly convinced that my temperature is 98 degrees, but I do
not have the slightest idea why I believe that .” Thus, the doctors
conclude that this confirms that the device works, that is, it
“worked just as it was designed to do and is functioning
properly to produce true beliefs on the hour about the brain
temperature of Mr. Truetemp.”18
Now, the problem that this poses for Plantinga is that Mr.
Truetemp is having true beliefs about his temperature. His
beliefs are “produced by a device that is properly functioning to
produce true beliefs as it was designed to do in the environment
it was designed for.”19 But, “Mr. Truetemp does not know that
his temperature is 98 degrees when he believes it is.”20 Thus,
Mr. Truetemp‟s account fulfills Plantinga‟s account for warrant
but it does not produce knowledge. Thus, this objection
demonstrates that proper functionality is not a sufficient
condition for knowledge.
The second objection that Lehrer raises against Plantinga
is the example of Ms. Prejudice. Just as the previous example
showed that proper functionality is not sufficient, this objection
shows that proper functionality is not a necessary condition for
knowledge. This example demonstrates how a belief might arise
from improper functioning (e.g. racial prejudice) but become
warranted later by the acquisition of evidence. Take for
example, Ms. Prejudice. Ms. Prejudice has a strong belief that
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members of a race contract a certain disease because of their
genetic makeup. This, for her, demonstrates their racial
inferiority, and her racial superiority. Now, also take into
consideration that Ms. Prejudice is a medical student and
through her research comes to discover that the medical
evidence for her prejudiced belief is strong. In time, she becomes
a very successful and respected medical research scientist, and
she gets nominated to be on a research team to investigate the
genetic nature of this elusive diease. As circumstances permit,
all of her fellow research colleagues know of her prejudice and
determine that she will be a good member of the team because of
her prejudice (that is, she will be the strongest opposition that
they could possibly find). But they also know of her strong
convictions to science and medicine. So, they are completely
confident in her ability.
As the team‟s research develops, it becomes clearer that
the evidence points to the claim that the disease is indeed caused
by genetic makeup of the patient. Thus, Ms. Prejudice becomes
very careful with her evidence so that she cannot be charged
with making conclusions based on her unwarranted belief.
However, the evidence becomes overwhelming. To the dismay
of the other medical researchers, they all conclude that the
evidence conclusively demonstrates that the disease is indeed
derived from the genetics of the patient. Thus the evidence has
been rigorously tested, but her belief that the disease is
genetically caused is the result of her still very intense prejudice.
That is, “After the investigation, her belief has warrant, all the
warrant the matter admits of, and she knows that the disease is
genetically caused.”21 But, “her belief is the product of an
improperly functioning system of racial prejudice.”22
Again this example is a problem for Plantinga. It
demonstrates how one who has knowledge, true beliefs, and
beliefs that are warranted does not arrive at one‟s beliefs via
cognitive faculties functioning properly. Therefore, with these
two examples, Lehrer has demonstrated that proper functionality
is neither necessary nor sufficient as a condition for knowledge.
(IV) Plantinga’s Responses
The counterexample of Mr. Truetemp, Plantinga claims,
does not pose a problem for his account of warrant. Plantinga
claims, that Mr. Truetemp has a belief that no one else has,
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namely that he has beliefs about his temperature. However, if he
shared these beliefs with other people, they would think that he
is mad. That is, Mr. Truetemp is “constructed like other human
beings and none of them have this ability; furthermore, everyone
he meets scoffs or smiles at his claim that he does have it.”23 This
accounts for a defeater in his system of beliefs. That is, since
these experiences are out of the ordinary of any properly
functioning system, then this anomaly is enough to defeat his
claims that he does indeed have knowledge of his temperature.
But how viable of a solution is this anyway? It seems that
all that is required to defeat Mr. Truetemp‟s “defeater” is for the
doctors to simply explain to Truetemp what they had implanted
in his brain and how it is supposed to function. That is, they
could explain what it is supposed to do, and under what
conditions it is functioning properly to Mr. Truetemp. However,
if he knows the device is in his brain, does that follow that he
now knows what his temperature is, as opposed to holding a
true belief without knowledge? According to Plantinga, if Mr.
Truetemp believes that the device is indeed delivering true
beliefs about his temperature then clearly, yes. But, Mr.
Truetemp never gets this opportunity to reflect about whether
the belief is true or not, he just assents to it without ever
wondering if it is caused in the right way.
On this point, Plantinga may want to claim that this can
count as a special case of a cognitive process. That is, the fact
that I am simply and directly having a belief, Plantinga might
ask whether one can “take this to be a special limiting case of
cognitive faculties or belief-producing processes functioning
properly?”24 Plantinga has therefore been willing to say that
“this belief isn‟t exactly produced by a cognitive faculty, or at
least by one of my cognitive faculties; but it is produced by a
properly functioning cognitive process, and I [Plantinga] think
that‟s sufficient.”25
But, wait a second. In both of these objections, the agents
are receiving true beliefs passively. That is, they are not directly
aware of the cause of their true beliefs, or of the „why‟ of their
true beliefs. They assent to their beliefs without determining if
their beliefs are caused in the right way or if their cognitive
equipment is working properly. They lack justification. But in
the Mr. Truetemp example, Plantinga is quick to say that it does
not count as warrant because of the lack of cognitive faculties,
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but later would be committed to claiming that as long as it is
caused by a cognitive process, then it can be warranted. So,
what‟s the difference?
Plantinga has not given a clear account of why he thinks
one way or the other. He has only suggested the latter is
produced by a “properly functioning cognitive process”. But so
is the former. That is, the process that Plantinga is referring to in
the latter (receiving true beliefs) is also present in the former
(receiving true beliefs). I am not sure how Plantinga might try to
respond to this. However, in light of considering one agent
superior over the other, with equal consideration of evidence, it
is clear that he must respond to this.
Conclusion
The problems that Plantinga is committed to responding
to involve the same type of problems that he was originally
responding to in the Great Pumpkin Objection. I agree with Van
Hook when he claims that Plantinga takes the Great Pumpkin
Objection too lightly, and clearly from this paper, it has resulted
in making vague statements about proper basicality. Perhaps
Plantinga needs to go back and reformulate his responses to the
Great Pumpkin Objection, since that seems to be where his
troubles begin. Or perhaps Plantinga does after all have to
concede to either the strong foundationalist or the coherence
theorist, and place knowledge of God‟s existence on some
foundation or coherence with other beliefs.
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